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I. INTRODUCTION
T requires no citations to establish what is obvious to tax profession-
als within and without the government: corporate tax shelters are
proliferating, in both type and number, and their terms are becoming
ever more audacious. The problem has a demand side: corporations are
increasingly willing to treat taxes as a cost to be avoided, with the efficacy
of avoidance increasingly being measured purely in monetary, probabilis-
tic terms with only passing attention to ethical and public perception con-
cerns. But it also has a supply side, with tax practitioners, who
historically have had ethical concerns stemming from professional re-
sponsibility, increasingly under competitive pressure to satisfy clients.
Tax practitioners are regularly called upon to review tax shelter prod-
ucts-preplanned transactions, like that involved in ACM Partnership v.
* The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Joshua M. Holmes. All rights
reserved.
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Commissioner,1 with elaborately choreographed steps motivated by the
prospect of capturing unintended (though sometimes plausible) and un-
reasonable tax benefits rather than a true business purpose. While the
dollar volume of transactions is not readily ascertainable, its significance
is evident in the fact that the major accounting and investment banking
firms, as well as some law firms, maintain large departments staffed with
highly compensated professionals who devote all their efforts to generat-
ing tax shelter products, an expensive exercise which they would not un-
dertake if it were not lucrative. Since the revenues of these departments
are based directly or indirectly on the expected tax savings (generally rep-
resenting a small sharing in the present value thereof) large tax revenue
losses can reasonably be projected. This conclusion is consistent with the
experience of tax practitioners asked to review tax shelter schemes on
behalf of corporate clients. It is a common experience to find, for exam-
ple, that a corporation's disclosure of a planned or consummated divesti-
ture results in a flood of competing offers to shelter the gain before or
after it is realized.
Coupled with the proliferation of shelters is the increase in their audac-
ity. Tax shelter promoters and their advisers, it is clear, are pitching
transactions increasingly dependent on the audit lottery. "Do nothing
and you pay the tax, do our deal you may not and if you're caught rely on
an 'opinion' to deflect penalties" is the common refrain. An "opinion" in
this context is a plausible, but shallow, reading of the tax law concluding
that the shelter "should" work, which the promoter puts forward as a
talisman against penalties. In the interest of efficiency, promoters regu-
larly recycle old shelters that have been targeted by statutory, regulatory
or interpretive changes by modifying some element of the transaction to
avoid the literal terms of the change (narrowly read) while retaining the
same discredited shelter objective. Impatience with this charade has fi-
nally led courts to sustain penalties and the I.R.S. to threaten criminal
sanctions in egregious cases. 2
1. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
2. Penalties were imposed in United Parcel Service of America v. Commissioner, 78
T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999), involving a shifting of insurance income to a foreign captive,
and in a recent case involving corporate owned life insurance, I.R.S. v. CM Holdings, 254
B.R. 578 (D. Del. 2000). The I.R.S. raised the specter of criminal sanctions in connection
with the third in a series of abusive transactions involving assumed liabilities. See I.R.S.
Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (stating that a loss is allowable as a deduction only if it
is bona fide and reflects actual economic consequences). The tax shelters at which Notice
2000-44 aims are based on the mismeasurement of assumed liabilities. In one variation, the
taxpayer receives $300x from a lender but the parties take the position that, because of the
interest rate premium, the stated principal amount is only $200x and the remaining $100x is
interest. These loan proceeds are then dropped into a partnership, which purchases assets
worth $300x. Taxpayer claims a basis in the partnership interest of $100x, on the grounds
that the partnership only assumed $200x of liabilities. When the taxpayer sells its partner-
ship interest for fair market value (a nominal amount because its balance sheet reveals a
net worth close to zero), the sale generates a loss of $100x. In a second variation, the
taxpayer buys one call option and writes another offsetting it. Both the purchased and the
written call options are then contributed to a partnership. Taxpayer, taking advantage of
perceived uncertainty as to whether a written call option constitutes a liability, takes the
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Much has been said and written of the tax shelter explosion. 3 Some of
it deals with the demand side of the equation, some with supply. Govern-
ment commentators and tax policy experts assert serious concerns based
on immediate revenue loss and overall adverse impact on the tax system,
its fairness and efficiency, and taxpayer compliance morality. Some other
commentary is self-interested denial on the part of shelter promoters and
their captive advisers, who rely upon the difficulties in measuring this
"black box" phenomenon to support their argument that the problem is
not extensive. A third voice, that of the highest levels of the tax practi-
tioner community, represented most visibly by the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section and the American Bar Association Section on
Taxation, has been heard as well. These organizations are well suited to
deal with, among other things, the professional and systemic responsibili-
ties, duties and functions of tax advsers in the tax shelter context.
While differing somewhat as to specifics, these organizations have
maintained a common aversion to the tax shelter phenomenon. This
strongly felt and expressed sentiment reflects concern about the systemic
effects of shelters and the pressures on conscientious advisers to support
questionable deals. Less commonly recognized, this reaction also reflects
tax shelters' implicit disparagement of the intellectual foundations of
principled and creative tax practice. In such transactions, an elaborate
series of formal steps is contrived to lead to an unreasonably beneficial
tax result, usually resulting from some defect or ambiguity in the tax law.
When a tax shelter is attacked by the I.R.S., the taxpayer relies on the
form and the government makes the argument, in one variation or an-
other, that the transaction should not generate the tax benefits attendant
to its form because that form does not reflect its substance or because the
transaction has no substance-i.e., no business purpose. But the relation-
ship between form and substance, and the respect to be accorded each,
position that its basis in the acquired partnership interest is simply its basis in the pur-
chased call option. This interpretation was rejected by the Tax Court in Salina P'ship v.
Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (2000). The artificially high basis generates a loss when the
partnership interest is sold at its nominal fair market value. The I.R.S. referred to possible
criminal penalties in discussing attempts to conceal the transaction by having a grantor
trust hold the shelter and the underlying appreciated asset and then (improperly) netting
the gain and loss of the grantor trust.
3. The tax shelter phenomenon has generated a wealth of tax literature. On the gov-
ernment side, the U.S. Treasury's White Paper on The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters
released July 1, 1999, and the Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Study of Present Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (including Provisions Re-
lating to Corporate Tax Shelters) 3 (Comm. Print 1999), as well as Comparison of Recom-
mendations Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters Made by the Dept. of Treasury and the
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation (Comm. Print 2000) provide very useful summaries
of tax shelters and anti-shelter proposals. Outstanding examples of the professional litera-
ture include Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance: Corporate Tax Shelters and the Com-
paq Case, 88 TAX NoTEs 221 (2000); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic
Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999); and Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Tax Shelters and
Corporate Tax Management, 51 TAX EXECUTIVE 231 (1999).
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also vitally concerns tax practitioners who are involved in real world
transactions motivated by true business purposes.
The jurisprudence relating to tax shelters draws upon case law that
often involved real world transactions with a business purpose, but also
with a form that provided a tax benefit. There is, however, a stark con-
trast between the way in which practitioners and courts apply substantial-
ity doctrines in tax shelter cases and real world cases. In real world cases,
the analysis of the relationship between form and substance is nuanced.
In tax shelters, promoters attempt to apply a patina of substance to a
transaction that is formal and unreal. To the tax adviser in true business
transactions, the existence of substance is a given and form is usually a
friend to the extent it permits the tax planner to control the tax results of
a given substantial transaction by employing one form rather than an-
other. In such typical cases, the tax, practitioner favors respect for form.
But form can also be an enemy in that legal or other constraints may
compel the use of a form for a real transaction that has adverse tax ef-
fects. In some of these cases, the tax law may allow, and the I.R.S. may
acknowledge, a recharacterization of the transaction to reflect its sub-
stance and business purpose despite its form. By contrast, to the tax shel-
ter promoter and its adviser, form is always a friend and substance always
an enemy to be expiated. In a tax shelter, form is malleable because it
needs to conform only to tax needs and not business objectives.
The common reaction of the key organizations representing tax profes-
sionals has been to focus on what they perceive to be the underlying
weakness of tax shelter economics-the dependence on concealment and
the audit lottery.4 This would be accomplished by a requirement for
prompt and discriminating disclosure of tax shelters, increased I.R.S. au-
dit activity, penalties for shelters (heavier if not disclosed) which fail on
the merits, and de-valuation of opinions as a means to deflect penalties
(by creating strict liability for tax structures that fail). 5 More troublesome
to many practitioners are proposals for a substantive disallowance provi-
sion that could trend in the direction of a general anti-avoidance rule.
Such a provision would permit the I.R.S. to change the results that would
otherwise flow from a transaction if it failed a test relating to its economic
substance. Supporters of such a rule believe it will act as a deterrent both
by improving the I.R.S.'s litigating position and arming conscientious tax
advisers with a weapon to persuade clients to resist tax shelter promoters.
In response, opponents contend that the types of shelters caught by the
provision almost certainly would fail under current case law and that the
4. See New York State Bar Association (Tax Section), Report on Corporate Tax Shel-
ters of New York State Bar Association Tax Section, 83 TAX NoTEs 879 (May 10, 1999);
see also Revenue Raising Proposals in the Administration's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget. Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Stefan F.
Tucker, on behalf of the Section of Taxation American Bar Association).
5. Thus, the NYSBA report recommends that penalties apply to shelters that fail in
litigation whether or not opinions had been rendered, with heavier penalties for non-dis-
closed transactions. This approach would obviate, to some extent, the need to deal with
opinion standards in corporate tax shelters.
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plethora of recent anti-shelter decisions should sufficiently arm any con-
scientious adviser. In tax shelter cases, the case law doctrines are regu-
larly applied to reject the tax benefit associated with form. Tax
practitioners by and large, are comfortable that judges, in applying these
doctrines, will be able to distinguish real transactions from artificial tax
shelters. They may be less comfortable when a legislative solution is pro-
posed to codify the anti-shelter case law because such an approach may
fail to capture the subtlety and discrimination of the courts.
The difficulty of defining the class of transactions to be covered by a
substantive disallowance rule has also been the focus of much attention.
While showing a willingness to accept definitional over-inclusion in the
disclosure-penalty regimes (in effect requiring disclosure of some transac-
tions that might not be considered offensive shelters) so long as the effi-
cacy of the scheme is not blunted by reams of disclosure, many
professional advisers (represented, for example, by the NYSBA) have
been much less willing to be vague, over-inclusive, or under-inclusive in a
substantive business purpose codification.
Also cited, but less frequently analyzed, has been generalized concern
on the part of these practitioner organizations with codifying, and in the
process altering, the sophisticated judicially created body of law relating
to the relationship of substance and form. Such a change could unpre-
dictably alter the landscape for tax practitioners, who often rely on form
but also at times (and sometimes with I.R.S. support) on substance to the
extent it conflicts with form. It could also have the unintended effect of
limiting the scope of the I.R.S.'s ability to challenge form on the basis of
substance in cases not falling within the narrow scope of the statute and
discouraging the I.R.S. from embracing substance when the form of the
transaction would generate unreasonably adverse or beneficial results for
taxpayers.
It is not the purpose of this article to deal yet again with the tax shelter
phenomenon per se or the merits of various responses, a subject in any
event admirably analyzed by recent literature. Rather, it probes the es-
tablished tax bar's reaction to the tax shelter disease and proposed reme-
dies, which in turn requires an understanding of the differences between
(i) real transactions and tax shelters; (ii) the background, training and
intellectual outlook of tax advisers involved in real transactions and those
structuring tax shelters; and (iii) the role of substance versus form and
business purpose in real transactions and in tax shelters.
II. REAL TRANSACTIONS VERSUS TAX SHELTERS
Critics, some of them sincere and well meaning, of all attempts to rein
in tax shelters often make the point that it is difficult to draw the line
precisely between tax shelters and real business transactions. While de-
fining tax shelters may be difficult and while there are cases on the bor-
derline, experienced tax professionals can usually readily distinguish tax
shelters from real transactions. Importantly, the courts have shown un-
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commonly good judgment and common sense in distinguishing between
the two classes. The distinction they draw is not narrowly based on a
single test, such as a formulaic minimum return requirement, but rather
the entirety of the transaction, including the way it was created and sold,
the involvement of extraneous (usually tax-exempt) parties, shifting allo-
cations, and the presence of unusual contrived steps.
It is this experience which provides a reasonable basis for the tax bar's
conclusion that the problem can largely be solved by disclosure and pen-
alty rules that focus attention on tax shelters and increase the costs of
disallowance of shelter benefits. If this conclusion is sound, there is little
need for (and adverse consequences would attend) taking the further step
of expressly authorizing the I.R.S. to alter substantive tax rules, in shelter
cases or otherwise. Many shelters are simply based on erroneous or dis-
torted interpretations of law-often ignoring relevant provisions, mis-
reading ambiguities, and almost always ignoring the underlying purpose
of the law. Almost all are also at least disingenuous as to the purpose for
entering into the transaction. It is the rare shelter that so cleverly ex-
ploits a provision of tax law as to afford proponents a relatively high de-
gree of confidence that a court reviewing the transaction, in the light of
its overall terms and motivations, would sustain the unreasonable result.
Even in such a case, there is always the possibility of retroactive I.R.S.
administrative attack under the many available statutory and regulatory
authorizations and even quasi-retroactive legislative change. 6
Distinguishing tax shelters from real transactions is often a frustrating
exercise because tax shelters are usually designed to mimic real transac-
tions. In this respect, tax shelters bear a relationship to real transactions
analogous to the relationship between money laundering and banking.
As in that analogy, rules designed to curb the abusive activity are a
source of complexity in non-abusive cases. Without attempting to com-
pete with the numerous proposed attempts to define corporate tax shel-
ters, it is perhaps useful to compare real transactions (even aggressively
structured ones) and tax shelters in terms of their origins, purposes, con-
stituent parties, and common structural features.
Real transactions, most obviously, have as their origins and purpose
making money in the short-run or the long-run by increasing revenues or
reducing (non-tax) expenses. As a subset, business-based financings at-
tempt to raise capital for the company's business. Taxes of course play a
role in analyzing financings and other business transactions, but they do
not provide the primary motivation for undertaking the transaction. Tax
shelters by contrast exist principally to reduce taxes by generating tax
benefits usually derived from losses or credits that reflect outlays, ex-
penses, and negative economic items. The equity investment in a real
6. For an administrative approach, see for example Notice 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 407,
retroactively attacking "step-down" preferred, a widely marketed transaction that
threatened massive tax revenue losses. For a legislative response, see for example I.R.C. §
332(c) (1998) and its legislative history, dealing with liquidating REITs and RICs.
[Vol. 54
TAX PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
transaction is aimed at generating a sufficient economic return to exceed,
on a risk-adjusted basis, the entity's cost of capital. The investment in a
tax shelter is a fee paid for tax benefits. The investor either expects to
lose it or expects a return with an economic yield that is below market on
a risk-adjusted basis. 7 The economic return, if present, is often a carefully
calibrated item designed to satisfy a perceived talismanic business pur-
pose standard. The economic risk is likewise circumscribed so that, while
predictable small losses may exist, large unpredictable losses do not.
Real transactions generally arise from commercial contacts, in-house
corporate development and similar departments, business brokers and
outside investment advisers. If not originated in-house, they are gener-
ally marketed to the sectors of corporate management dealing with acqui-
sitions, divestitures, finance, corporate development, etc. They usually
reflect a business or financing idea, not a tax-savings idea. Tax shelters
are generally created by specialized tax professionals, usually but not al-
ways independent of the corporation in question. If developed outside
the corporation they are generally marketed to the tax or finance depart-
ment of the corporation, although in some high profile, large dollar cases
the pitch is made to the highest management levels.8
Real transactions generally involve real parties in interest (e.g. buyer
and seller) with financing parties supplying capital at market rates of re-
turn. Tax shelters often, probably most of the time, involve accommoda-
tion parties that are not U.S. taxpayers (e.g. foreign entities, tax-exempts,
loss corporations) to whom income is deflected, often through a partner-
ship or other non-taxed entity.
Real transactions, other than financings, are generally open-ended with
undefined outcomes. Corporations expect them to generate returns that
exceed the corporation's cost of capital but also expect a corresponding
risk of loss. (Financings generally involve predictable outlays but gener-
ate proceeds whose investment is expected to generate open-ended re-
turns, or at least returns that exceed (pre-tax) financing costs.) In
contrast, tax shelters usually involve largely predictable outcomes in or-
der to assure that the expected tax benefit will be available to offset a
particular gain or income item. To achieve the predictable result, care-
fully scripted scenarios are usually followed. Indeed, it is the choreo-
graphed series of steps-typically foreign to the corporation's usual
business, involving extraneous parties and often employed by other users
of the same shelter type-that courts often seize upon in branding a
transaction as a shelter.
Although in theory the line between a tax shelter and an aggressively
structured real transaction may appear difficult to draw, in actuality the
7. Investments in municipal bonds or leveraged leases might seem to fit this descrip-
tion but are distinguishable because the below-market economic returns reflect tax bene-
fits intentionally and expressly conferred by Congress on the classes of persons claiming
them.
8. This latter path was apparently pursued in peddling the shelters that led to ACM
and related cases. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
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distinction is generally rather easy to establish when the transaction in-
volves most of the tax shelter elements described above. That is why it
may be hard to define shelters legislatively (and the difficulty is com-
pounded if the stakes are substantive disallowance as opposed to disclo-
sures and penalties) but so easy for courts to determine whether an actual
transaction is a shelter. Consider these variations on partnership transac-
tions. In the first case, corporations A and B contribute businesses to a
partnership, A receives 90% from the income from B's business, B 90%
of A's, with the expectation of a redemption of A in year eight for B's
business. In the second case, A contributes its business, B contributes
cash, partnership borrows cash (recourse to A) and distributes it to A;
expected redemption of A in year eight. The third case parallels case two
but the redemption is for stock of a subsidiary holding high-basis invest-
ment assets. In the fourth, A and B contribute cash, assets are acquired
and sold in a manner designed to generate an artificial tax gain which is
allocated to B, a non-taxable entity; B is redeemed and A is left with an
artificial loss. Most observers would treat the first and second as real
business transactions, the third as an aggressive but real business transac-
tion, and the fourth as a tax shelter.
The tax shelter stigma attaches most firmly and justifiably to transac-
tions involving loss generation and/or tax-exempt accommodation parties
to whom income is deflected or whose investment is used to generate a
loss allocated to the shelter investor but without the tax consequences of
debt incurrence. The ACM case, for example, drew precious few criti-
cisms of the outcome, which seemed well deserved. As for step-down
preferred, the severe I.R.S. reaction reflected both the abusive nature of
the transaction (deflecting uneconomic amounts of income to tax-exempt
holders with matching artificial deductions to taxpayers for the equivalent
of principle amortization) and its massive revenue implications. This was
in the context of a transaction that probably worked under then-existing
rules but was too good to be true. The same could also be said of so-
called liquidating REIT transactions.
Transactions involving income shifting within an affiliated group,9 un-
warranted interest deductions on corporate-owned life insurance' ° or for-
eign tax-credits on dividend-stripping transactions11 exist in the
hinterland between merely aggressive transactions and tax shelters, the
border crossed as artificiality increases and tax benefits become more un-
reasonable. Cottage Savings-type transactions, resulting in recognition of
true economic losses, have been sustained by the courts and would not
generally be regarded as true tax shelters by practitioners. 12
Financial products and their development fall into an interstitial class
between real transactions and tax shelters. They admittedly often entail a
9. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262 (1999).
10. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 254 (1999).
11. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 363 (1999).
12. See Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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great deal of tax motivation and their development sometimes more
closely resembles that of shelters than real transactions in that tax plan-
ning, rather than a business plan, often generates the product. There are,
however, significant differences between classic shelter activity and finan-
cial product innovation. In the first place, the tax benefits sought in fi-
nancial products do not generally involve abuse of the tax system to the
same degree as true shelters. Gross sheltering of unrelated income is typ-
ically not involved, and the deductions generated substantially comport
with the investor's return. Deferring gain, deducting interest on instru-
ments With equity elements, and exploiting the inconsistencies between
U.S. and foreign systems are standard themes in tax planning and ap-
proach abuse only in extreme cases, like stepped-down preferred, where
there is the risk of gross permanent avoidance of tax and not mere defer-
ral. Indeed, it can be argued that some of these instruments rightly blunt
the over-taxation of corporate earnings on equity as opposed to debt cap-
ital and others diminish the excess rigor of General Utilities repeal, espe-
cially as it relates to sales of portfolio stock investments. Moreover,
financial product development is not nearly as dependent on concealment
and the audit lottery. The instruments are often publicly traded and tax
lectures regularly detail their inner workings.
III. THE TAX BAR VERSUS THE TAX SHELTER BAR
Tax professionals are involved in planning real transactions and in facil-
itating tax shelters. The two types of practice are vastly different and the
two categories of tax professional are equally distinct. In general and
historically, individuals who plan real transactions are not involved in tax
shelters, other than reviewing them for clients, and professionals who
plan or facilitate tax shelters rarely participate in mainstream, high profile
tax practice. The distinction has come under some pressure as of late,
reflecting the demand of corporate clients' intent on minimizing taxes by
virtually any means, as well as competitive concerns. But the fact remains
that the two categories differ in approach, training, expertise, judgment,
reputation, and status. The two types of practitioner differ most mark-
edly in their attitude toward the issues of substance versus form and busi-
ness purpose. An understanding of the differences between these two
types of practice and two classes of practitioner are important to an un-
derstanding of the different roles that these doctrines play in real transac-
tions as compared with tax shelters.
Tax practitioners involved in real transactions are called upon to cast a
desired business transaction in a form that is most beneficial from a tax
perspective. The basic business purpose is a given but there may be
choices as to form. The choice of form may involve balancing business,
legal, and financial constraints (including the desire for simple structures)
against tax benefits. Often the form beneficial to the client may be detri-
mental to the counter-party. The process is interactive, interpersonal,
and calls for negotiating as well as analytical skills.
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Despite the increased specialization of the tax bar, transactional tax
practice is more often than not the province of tax generalists versed in
the many areas that may be implicated in particular transactions. They
are as comfortable with "standards" as they are with "rules." The operat-
ing arena of such practitioners is generally the corporate law firm, al-
though corporations (especially large ones) have in-house advisers as
well.
Reputation greatly affects the effectiveness of such a tax practitioner.
A practitioner's reputation will provide credibility in dealing with clients,
opposing counsel, and the I.R.S. on audit and in connection with advance
rulings. In many large corporate transactions (public spin-offs, for exam-
ple) an advance I.R.S. ruling is often a practical prerequisite. Practition-
ers who have a reputation for knowledge and experience in real
transactions are, needless to say, given a warmer reception than those
who are less well known or are known for participating in tax shelter or
other aggressive transactions.
Reputation and status are based on the practitioner's transactional ex-
perience but are reinforced by professional writing, lecturing, participa-
tion in tax discussion groups, and most importantly through active
involvement in the high profile bar association tax sections, most promi-
nently the New York State Bar Association and the A.B.A. These orga-
nizations play an important role in the development of the tax law, a fact
widely acknowledged within and without government. The officer ranks
of these organizations are almost exclusively reserved for members in-
volved in real world tax practice, who have their colleagues' respect and
who are actively involved in improving the tax law through writing, lec-
turing, etc. It is inconceivable that a practitioner who specialized in tax
shelters would ever reach a position of responsibility in these
organizations.
The tax shelter professional is a different breed, by experience, temper-
ament, reputation, and calling. The differences reflect the wide gulf be-
tween real world tax and tax shelter practice. Instead of providing a tax
structure for a real business transaction, the tax shelter adviser creates an
artificial transaction to take advantage of a loophole. Such a transaction
cannot be real-no one wanted to do the transaction before the loophole
was discovered-it can only be made to appear real.
Tax shelter practitioners tend to be specialists rather than generalists
and often suffer from the specialist's lack of judgment. They are comfort-
able with "rules" but not "standards." Within the product development
departments of the entity that employs them, they ferret out lacunae in
the tax law and then build transactions around them. The hard part is not
finding the loophole (there are plenty around and most have been written
up). Rather, it is cloaking the shelter in the mantle of a real transaction
by incorporating the requisite economic return to satisfy a perceived "ec-
onomic substance" minimum threshold. A second major task is to sell
the idea to clients, through meetings and the preparation of a selling
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memorandum. The latter has the appearance of a legal opinion, though it
disclaims such status. It generally lays out the literalist arguments in
favor of the shelter and claims that some implanted "business purpose"
or economic return takes the transaction out of the category of tax shel-
ters regularly disallowed by the courts.
No one really believes the selling memorandum. It is enough that the
investor might reasonably believe it. If the investor wants the comfort of
a legal opinion to deflect penalties it does not rely on the selling memo-
randum (which expressly disclaims such responsibility) but obtains the
opinion from a law firm, usually one identified by the promoter as willing
to give the requisite comfort. The firms rendering such opinions bridge
the gap between real practice and shelter practice, with inevitable adverse
reputational consequences, given their role as facilitators of often-abusive
transactions. The investor's regular tax counsel may also be approached,
although the prospect of a negative view, which could taint reliance
claims, often discourages this approach.
In short, the real world and real world tax practice by and large bears
scant resemblance to the tax shelter world and its tax practice. The dif-
ferences are reflected in the manner in which both are impacted by busi-
ness purpose and substance versus form doctrines.
IV. SUBSTANCE, FORM, AND PURPOSE IN THE REAL
TAX WORLD
The many cases dealing with substance and form in real world transac-
tions represent an extensive and pervasive body of law, unmatched by
case law in other countries, most of which give far greater weight to
form.13 The usual cases involving I.R.S. attacks based on substance are
familiar to all practitioners. It may be interesting and useful to focus in-
stead on instances in which the I.R.S. has facilitated business transactions
by permitting the taxpayer to re-characterize form to accord with sub-
stance and cases in which the I.R.S.'s view of substance has changed as
the underlying stakes or structural features of the tax law have changed.
It is important to note the role that fundamental, structural principles
of tax law play in applying substance-form and other recharacterization
doctrines. Tax lawyers, the I.R.S., and the courts regularly appraise trans-
actions in light of their consistency with such fundamental doctrines.
These doctrines include: the creation of tax basis; the preservation of ba-
sis; the consequences of debt incurrence, satisfaction, and forgiveness; the
realization concept and its limitations; the relative acceptability of defer-
ral versus permanent avoidance; and the analysis of a transaction as a
distribution or an exchange, at the shareholder and corporate levels.
These rules change over time; witness the repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. With such repeal, the idea that corporate assets can leave cor-
13. See Robert Thorton Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel, 53
TAX LAW. 1 (1999); Robert Thorton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer's Right to
Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAx LAW. 137 (1990).
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porate solution with a new tax basis is anathema. Whether stock of an-
other corporation should be treated as such an asset is more problematic:
the repeal of "mirror" liquidations in 1987 and limitations on Morris
Trust transactions in 1997 suggest an affirmative answer but the continued
tax-free status of spin-offs in general, coupled with the over-taxation that
results when corporate stock sales are taxed without a step-up in the basis
of the underlying assets, suggests the contrary. 14
A. DISREGARDING TRANSITORY ENTITIES AND
CIRCULAR CASH FLOWS
The notion that a transitory subsidiary or a circular flow of cash may be
disregarded, for the benefit of the taxpayer as well as the government, is
so well ingrained as to be taken for granted. It has largely been forgotten
that the I.R.S. Revenue Rulings and Letter Rulings dealing with these
issues played a fundamental role in the several phases of corporate acqui-
sition activity since 1967.
The story begins with Revenue Ruling 67-448, which reads in its en-
tirety as follows:
Where, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, a parent corporation, P,
issues some of its voting shares to its new subsidiary, S, and S imme-
diately merges into unrelated corporation, Y, with the result that the
shareholders of Y receive shares of P and P receives 80 percent or
more of the shares of Y, the substance of the transaction is an acqui-
sition by P, in exchange solely for part of its voting stock, of stock of
Y within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954.
Advice has been requested whether the transaction described below
qualifies as a reorganization within the meaning of section
368(a)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Corporation P and Corporation Y, incorporated in the same state,
are publicly owned corporations. Corporation P wanted to acquire
the business of Corporation Y but could do so with an effective re-
sult only if the corporate entity of Y were continued intact due to the
necessity of preserving its status as a regulated public utility. P also
desired to eliminate the possibility of minority shareholders in the
event less than all of the shareholders of Y agreed to the transaction.
Since an outright acquisition of stock pursuant to a reorganization as
defined in section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code would not achieve this
result, the plan of reorganization was consummated as follows: (a) P
transferred shares of its voting stock to its newly formed subsidiary,
S, in exchange for shares of S stock. (b) S (whose only asset con-
sisted of a block of the voting stock of P) merged into Y in a transac-
tion which qualified as a statutory merger under the applicable state
law. (c) Pursuant to the plan of reorganization and by operation of
14. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10223(a)-
(c), 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 337(d), 304(b)(4) and 355(b)(2)(D));




state law, the S stock owned by P was converted into Y stock. At the
same time the Y stock held by its shareholders was exchanged for
the P stock received by Y on the merger of S into Y. The end result
of these actions was that P acquired from the shareholders of Y in
exchange for its own voting stock more than 95 percent of the stock
of Y.
(d) Y shareholders owning less than five percent of the stock of Y
dissented to the merger and had the right to receive the appraised
145 value of their shares paid solely from the assets of Y. No funds,
or other property, have been or will be provided by P for this
purpose.
Thus, upon the consummation of the plan of reorganization Y be-
came a wholly owned subsidiary of P.
At the time of the transaction P had no plan or intention to liquidate
Y or to merge it into any other corporation.
The transaction described above does not constitute a reorganization
within the meaning of either section 368(a)(1)(A) or section
368(a)(1)(C) of the Code because no assets of Y were transferred to
nor acquired by another corporation in the transaction but rather all
assets (except for amounts paid to dissenting shareholders) were re-
tained in the same corporate entity.
Section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code provides in part that the term "re-
organization" means the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange
solely for all or a part of its voting stock, of stock of another corpora-
tion if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation
has control of such other corporation (whether or not such acquiring
corporation had control immediately before the acquisition).
It is evident that the shortest route to the end result described above
would have been achieved by a transfer of P voting stock directly to
the shareholders of Y in exchange for their stock. This result is not
negated because the transaction was cast in the form of a series of
interrelated steps. The transitory existence of the new subsidiary, S,
will be disregarded. The effect of all the steps taken in the series is
that Y became a wholly owned subsidiary of P, and P transferred
solely its voting stock to the former shareholders of Y.
Accordingly, the transaction will be treated as an acquisition by P, in
exchange solely for part of its voting stock, of stock of Y in an
amount constituting control (as defined in section 368(c) of the
Code) of Y, which qualifies as a reorganization within the meaning
of section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code. 15
The clarity, brevity, and elegance of this ruling are remarkable. To dis-
regard the transitory subsidiary at taxpayer's behest seems so easy today
but few advisers could have comfortably assumed this result in a major
transaction absent the Revenue Ruling. Indeed, before the ruling was
published, it would have been necessary to obtain a letter ruling to feel
safe in this conclusion. Moreover, a contrary result could easily be
reached: if the subsidiary's existence were not disregarded, the transac-
tion could have been analyzed as an acquisition by Target of Subsidiary
15. Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144.
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(owning Acquiror stock) followed by a taxable distribution of Acquiror
stock by Target. For what it is worth, foreign jurisdictions often have a
difficult time dealing with reverse subsidiary mergers because they cannot
take the leap of imagination to disregard an entity's existence. In Ger-
many, in particular, it is only recently, and through elaborate mechanics,
that it became possible to conclude safely that corporate and tax require-
ments are met in reverse mergers.
Revenue Ruling 67-448 played a key role in the stock-based takeovers
of the 1970s, allowing Acquirors to force Target shareholders to take
stock in a reorganization without transfer of Target assets and often with-
out an Acquiror shareholder vote. While the subsequent enactment of
Section 368(a)(2)(E) of the Code codified these results, Revenue Ruling
67-448's creative approach was extended to other areas, making viable
other important transactional formats.
Revenue Ruling 73-42716 treated exchanges in a reverse merger which
did not qualify for reorganization treatment as taxable sales of shares (the
consideration coming from Acquiror) not generating corporate level tax.
Revenue Ruling 78-250,17 held such a transaction to be a redemption
where the cash paid to shareholders originated in Target. These rulings
facilitated the cash takeovers and leveraged buyouts of the 1980s and
1990s. The use of reverse mergers to combine two public companies
under a new holding company in a section 351 incorporation, in turn,
played a vital role in cross-border combinations in which true merger
treatment was not available under section 368(a)(1)(A).
This line of thinking was also extended to the foreign and partnership
areas. Thus, in Revenue Ruling 78-39718 and Revenue Ruling 83-142,19
the I.R.S. disregarded a circular flow of cash, thus facilitating restructur-
ings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Finally, in Revenue Rul-
ing 66-26420 the I.R.S. held that a partnership's sale of assets to a new
partnership owned by some of its partners would be treated as a redemp-
tion of the non-continuing partners' interests, thus avoiding asset-level
gain.
It is not too much to say that this series of rulings was responsible for
facilitating trillions of dollars of corporate realignments in the late twenti-
eth century, many of which would not have occurred or would have been
made much more difficult if the I.R.S. had not been willing to embrace
substance and ignore form.
B. BAUSCH & LOMB
In Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Comm'r,21 the Second Circuit ac-
16. Rev. Rul. 73-427, 1973-2 C.B. 301.
17. Rev. Rul. 78-250, 1978-1 C.B. 83.
18. Rev. Rul. 78-397, 1978-2 C.B. 150
19. Rev. Rul. 83-142, 1983-2 C.B. 68.
20. Rev. Rul. 66-264, 1966-2 C.B. 248.
21. 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1959).
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cepted the I.R.S.'s argument that the acquisition of a corporation's assets
by its corporate shareholder for the latter's stock did not qualify as a "C"
reorganization (assets solely for voting stock) because the shareholder in
fact acquired some of those assets for its historic ownership position in
Target. This is actually a logical construction, in accord with the sub-
stance of the transaction, since the Acquiror could not really be said to
acquire the portion of the Target's assets it already indirectly owned for
its own stock, the issuance of stock to itself being a non-event. Indeed,
this line of thinking remains important in the analysis of corporate inver-
sions and partnership dealings in partner stock.22
Despite the inherent logic of the position, Bausch & Lomb created
traps for the unwary, was easily avoided through planning (particularly,
the use of subsidiaries), and served no real tax policy purpose. Accord-
ingly, after forty years of living with this rule, the I.R.S. abandoned the
doctrine.23 In effect, form was allowed to govern rather than substance in
this narrow area.
C. STAPLED STOCK
The approach of the I.R.S. and the courts to stapled stock demon-
strates pointedly the difficulties of determining the true substance of a
transaction and the importance of context and consequences to this
determination.
Stapled stock consists of interests in two entities bound together so that
they may only be sold together. It raises the issue as to whether two
theoretically separate items of property should be treated as one if indi-
visible, and if so whether a parent-subsidiary or other relationship should
be implied as the result. It has resonance in the inverse case of tracking
stock, which is formally an interest in one entity but which "tracks" the
economic performance of another, usually a subsidiary of the issuer. In
stapled stock, two theoretically separate entities may be viewed as one
because of linkage. In tracking stock, two classes of stock of a single en-
tity may arguably be viewed as interests in two entities because the value
of each derives from the income and assets of only one of the two.
The problem dates back to the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals,
affirmed by the Second Circuit, in DeCoppet v. Helvering.24 The issue in
DeCoppet was whether a shareholder could take a worthless stock loss on
stock of an insolvent investment company stapled (through a trust).to
stock of a solvent bank.
The Board of Tax Appeals analyzed the matter as follows:
The petitioners say that they sustained a loss when the investment
corporation dissolved without assets and its shares became worthless.
We find it impossible to accept this view. Strictly speaking, in accor-
22. See Peter C. Canellos, Acquisition of Issuer Securities by a Controlled Entity: Peter
Pan Seafoods, May Department Stores and McDermott, 45 TAX LAW. 1 (1991).
23. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(d) (1998).
24. 108 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1940).
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dance with the conception which underlies the trust agreement of
May 1, 1929, they were never the owners of investment corporation
shares from the time of its organization until its dissolution. Their
investment was always in shares of the bank, and indissolubly within
that investment was embedded their more remote interest in the af-
fairs of the investment corporation; and those affairs, conducted by
the directors of the bank, might result in distribution to the trustees
and in turn to them. In 1929 petitioners paid $40 entirely to the bank
and the bank was to use $10 of it as a subscription for two shares of
investment corporation stock to be issued to the trustees, who were
the bank's directors. Aside from the New York law's requirement of
a separate corporation, the affairs conducted in the name of the in-
vestment corporation were inseparable from those of the bank. They
were conducted by the same persons, not because they happened to
be holding positions as directors of both corporations, but because it
was designed so and anything else was inherently impossible. The
identity of a trustee was not in his person but in his position as a
director or officer of the bank. Thus it was assured that there could
be no conflict between the interests of the two. This unity was car-
ried out in the identity of bank shareholders and trust beneficiaries;
in distributive interests of the investment corporation, one being pro-
portionate to the other; and in the evidence of both being shown by
the same certificate. To all this was added the injunction that no
holder might dispose of either alone; both must be held inseparably.
This unitary conception was thoroughly adopted and adhered to by
everyone at all times throughout the life of the enterprise at every
stage and in every change in its course.... The conclusion which
seems to us inevitable is that petitioners' investment must be re-
garded as existing in their bank stock and that their relation to the
investment corporation and the trust was an inherent part of their
ownership of bank shares, the ultimate disposition of which will re-
flect gain or loss upon the full basis of their cost.25
In DeCoppet, the I.R.S. prevailed in asserting that the substance of sta-
pled stock was unity of investment where the issue was taking a loss on
the stock of one of the stapled entities. In 1954, with the stakes changed,
the I.R.S. shifted field. In Revenue Ruling 54-140, the I.R.S. concluded
that stock held by a trustee for the benefit of shareholders of the parent,
such beneficial interests being inseparable from the stock of the parent,
nevertheless constituted a separate asset for tax purposes.2 6 The I.R.S.
relied on the fact that the shares were not subject to the bank's creditors,
depositors, and other third party claimants.
This revised I.R.S. position in turn was exploited by taxpayers seeking
to de-control foreign subsidiaries or corporations operating the proper-
ties of affiliated real estate investment trusts. Perhaps dubious about its
ability to alter its position yet again, the I.R.S. instead left the field to
Congress, which enacted section 269B of the Code in 1984.
25. DeCoppet v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 1381, 1392-94 (1938).
26. Rev. Rul. 54-140, 1954-1 C.B. 116.
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Section 269B was enacted to deal with several different types of
problems raised by stapled stock. In the foreign area, the major concern
was with "de-controlling" transactions pursuant to which shares of a for-
eign subsidiary were distributed to the parent's shareholders and then
"stapled" to the stock of the U.S. parent. The objective in such transac-
tions was to remove the foreign subsidiary from the constraints applicable
to controlled foreign corporations. In the second type of transaction,
shares of a regulated investment company or real estate investment trust
were stapled to shares in a corporation that conducted business which the
Code does not permit of such an entity. In each case, Congress came to
the conclusion that stapling was abusive in that it permitted shareholders
to obtain the economic benefits of combined ownership (including com-
mon control without fiduciary duty constraints) while evading limitations
which would apply to a parent/subsidiary structure. However, the under-
lying issues and tension remain in other areas that have not been the
subject of legislation. These include the tax consequences of issuing
tracking stock or so-called "dual-headed" transnational combinations in
which two, in theory, separate entities bind their fates together through
equalization and other contractual arrangements.
D. MORRIS TRUST
With the full repeal of General Utilities through the elimination of
"mirror liquidations" in 1987,27 spin-offs under section 355 of the Code
became the last legitimate escape from (as opposed to deferral of) tax
arising from dispositions of stock of another corporation. When coupled
with the post-spin acquisition of Distributing or Controlled (generally, for
technical tax reasons, Distributing) in a so-called Morris Trust transac-
tion,28 the result was a tax-efficient means of separating one corporation
into two, one of which would be combined with an Acquiror. In the pro-
cess, debt of the Target group was often realigned prior to the separation.
27. See Omnibus Budge Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10223(a)-
(c), 101 Stat. 1330 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 337(d), 304(b)(4) and 355(b)(2)(D)).
28. See Comm'r v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966) (holding that the distribu-
tion of stock of a newly formed subsidiary prior to a reorganization transaction in which
parent was not the surviving corporation qualified as tax-free under § 355 of the Code); see
also Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83 (assuming, but not explicitly deciding, that the distri-
bution of the stock of a subsidiary followed by a tax-free acquisition of the parent qualified
under § 355 of the Code); Rev. Rul. 78-251, 1978-1 C.B. 89 (concluding that a spin-off
undertaken to facilitate a tax-free acquisition of parent could qualify under § 355 of the
Code); Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125 (modified by Rev. Rul. 96-30, superceded by
Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-1 C.B. 1159) (finding that the distribution of the stock of a subsidiary
prior to its acquisition by an unrelated corporation, which acquisition was approved by the
post-spin-off shareholders of subsidiary, qualified as tax-free under § 355 of the Code);
Rev. Rul. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 36 (modifying Rev. Rul. 75-406, superceded by Rev. Rul. 98-
27) (narrowing Rev. Rul. 75-406 to transactions in which there have been no negotiations
to dispose of the stock of Controlled prior to the spin-off); Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-1 C.B.
1159 (superceding Rev. Rul. 75-406 and Rev. Rul. 96-30) (stating that the Service will not
apply Court Holding or the step transaction doctrine to determine if the distributed corpo-
ration was a controlled corporation immediately before the § 355 distribution solely be-
cause of any post-distribution acquisition or restructuring).
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Within limits, such realignment reflected the need to re-allocate consoli-
dated debt, usually carried on the parent's balance sheet, though sup-
ported by both parent and subsidiary assets, into two tranches, each
supported by one of the two entities. This was consistent with the philos-
ophy underlying the allocation of interest expense now contained in sec-
tions 1.861-9T through 1.861-11T of the Regulations-i.e., all of a group's
assets support its parent's liabilities. Although it was theoretically possi-
ble to use debt realignment to affect a quasi-sale of the entity merging
with Acquiror, in fact, the I.R.S. policed this issue closely by requiring
applicants for rulings to demonstrate that Distributing and Controlled
each wound up with an overall capitalization appropriate to its business.
Moreover, unlike a sale, a distribution followed by a reorganization did
not change the basis of corporate assets. Finally, imposing tax on such a
transaction without a step-up in asset basis would create multiple levels of
corporate tax.
Despite these arguments, the analogy to a tax-free sale caught the
fancy of the Treasury and Congress, resulting in the enactment of section
355(e) of the Code in 1997. Despite its genesis in concerns over debt
realignment, the provision ignores leverage entirely and instead taxes
Distributing when the distribution is part of a plan or series of related
transactions pursuant to which one or more persons acquire a fifty per-
cent or greater interest in Distributing or Controlled. Acquisitions occur-
ring within the four-year period commencing two years prior to the
distribution are presumed part of a plan unless the presumption is rebut-
ted. Highly criticized proposed regulations severely and unreasonably re-
strict the available means for rebutting the statutory presumption.
Section 355(e) is massive overkill, reaching transactions that in no way
resemble sales. These include: (i) post-spin acquisitions not in fact part
of a plan (if these were truly considered sales one would have to think the
Target shareholders who sold between the time of distribution and
merger "sale," and thus were deprived of the benefits of the "sale" were
terribly disadvantaged and should sue); (ii) transactions without leverage
shifting (if a "sale" by Distributing there are no proceeds); and
(iii) acquisitions followed by pro-rata spins (which in no way resemble
corporate sales because the spin will be made to all of Acquiror's share-
holders, not just the former Target Shareholders). 29 Section 355(e) in its
present unrefined form casts a pall on spins that is not justified by any
valid tax policy. It shows the risk of legislating (or interpreting) by refer-
ence to the "substance" of a transaction when substance is divined by
crude analogy-i.e., is the distribution-merger really a "sale."
29. I.R.C. § 355(e) (2000).
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V. SUBSTANCE, FORM, AND BUSINESS PURPOSE IN
TAX SHELTERS
In the above-described real world transactions, the tax analysis at-
tempts to divine the substance of the transaction to determine whether
the form adopted properly reflects the substance. If so, the consequences
expected to result from the form will in fact obtain. If not, the transac-
tion may be recast with tax consequences appropriate to the substance
and not the form. As noted, the re-characterization can benefit the gov-
ernment or taxpayers.
In tax shelters this refined analysis is secondary. The court's analysis
focuses first on the bona-fides of the transaction. Courts have shown re-
markable skill and persistence in pruning the (often intentionally) obfus-
catory underbrush of complex tax shelters to determine whether they
truly arose from business exigencies or attempts to generate unreasona-
ble tax benefits. Since the contrived steps needed to structure a transac-
tion benefiting from an arcane and uneconomic tax rule are usually
abnormal, discerning the nature of the transaction is not that difficult
once the transaction is understood in all its aspects. This is why tax shel-
ters fail regularly in court. While the result may be couched in terms of
lack of business purpose, promoters are foolish in believing (or persuad-
ing clients to believe) that the outcome turns on some requisite pre-tax
profit. In shelters, by definition, the economics do not allow for substan-
tial returns or actual equity investment, as would be appropriate to risk.
The calibrated, modest returns are an obvious afterthought.
Once a judge sees the transaction as a shelter, a function of inferences
that experienced judges are capable of making based on all the facts, the
result is predictable-taxpayer loses. The Tax Court, in particular, seems
to have accepted the view that the strain on the tax system would be
unbearable if tax-motivated transactions had to be sustained merely be-
cause they manage to encapsulate an uneconomic tax rule, however clear
by its terms. This result-oriented outlook resembles the approach of ap-
pellate courts, which often strive mightily not to reverse a criminal con-
viction on procedural grounds where guilt is clear. The shelter promoter
who loses on a claim for unreasonable tax benefits despite good technical
arguments based on arcane provisions and choreographed scenarios does
not deserve or receive much sympathy. This attitude is evident in the
scant concern for corporations that have had their tax shelter expecta-
tions undermined in a whole series of recent judicial decisions.
Nowhere is this judicial mindset more clearly displayed than in the
landmark and much analyzed Tax Court decision in ACM Partnership.30
Involved was one of a series of tax shelters sold by an investment banking
firm in the late 1980s. These were designed to generate capital losses by a
pre-arranged series of transactions affected through partnerships each in-
30. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997).
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volving a corporation seeking a loss, an investment bank and an offshore
bank. They have all failed in court, under one or more theories of attack.
The facts of the case, illuminatingly revealed in Judge Laro's opinion,
are highly complex but can essentially be summarized as follows:
(1) A corporation wished to shelter a capital gain which it had re-
ported in 1988 in the sale of a subsidiary.31
(2) An investment banking firm proposed to the corporation a tax
shelter designed to generate capital losses. The transaction, in essence,
involved the purchase of an asset by a partnership whose partners were
the corporation, a foreign bank, and the investment banker. The asset
would then be sold for a large cash down payment and a series of contin-
gent payments. Under applicable installment sale regulations, the part-
nership would unrealistically treat only a small portion of the asset's basis
as attributable to the cash proceeds. This allocation generated a large
(non-taxed) gain allocated to the foreign bank and left the installment
notes with basis in excess of value. Through a pre-arranged series of re-
demptions and sales, this built-in loss was recognized and allocated to the
corporation. A law firm gave the investment banker an opinion that the
installment reporting basis allocation was appropriate.
(3) The corporation rejected the proposal because it lacked cash to in-
vest and found the plan served no business purposes of the corporation, a
fact that troubled its tax director.
(4) Thereupon, the transaction was modified to provide that the asset
acquired was the corporation's own outstanding debt. With this change,
the transaction was recast as a "Liability Management Partnership," pur-
portedly offering the corporation certain advantages in restructuring its
debt. To fine tune this rationale the transaction was further modified to
insert an intermediate step, the purchase of Citicorp "private placement"
notes pending the acquisition of the corporation's debt. The private
placement notes were in turn promptly exchanged for cash and contin-
gent payment "Libor" installment notes, purportedly to hedge interest
rate exposure. Under the installment sale regulations, a large gain was
recognized in the year of sale and allocated to the bank. The Libor notes
were thereafter sold at a loss attributed to the corporation (the bank hav-
ing been redeemed out of the partnership). The cash proceeds were in-
vested in the corporation's debt.
Much effort and expense went into creating an appearance of business
purpose, which looked solid enough on first impression but proved to be
a thin veneer upon analysis. Judge Laro closely scrutinized the purported
justification and found it false and disingenuous. His ire clearly comes
through in the opinion:
Following our review of the record, with due regard to our view and
perception of the witnesses, we do not find any economic substance
31. Many corporate shelters involve the desire to avoid capital gains tax on disposi-




in the section 453 investment strategy. We are convinced that tax
avoidance was the reason for the partnership's purchase and sale of
the Citicorp Notes. We do not suggest that a taxpayer refrain from
using the tax laws to the taxpayer's advantage. In this case, however,
the taxpayer desired to take advantage of a loss that was not eco-
nomically inherent in the object of the sale, but which the taxpayer
created actually through the manipulation and abuse of the tax laws.
A taxpayer is not entitled to recognize a phantom loss from a trans-
action that lacks economic substance.32
The court noted that the hedging and arbitrage justifications for the
Citicorp Libor note acquisition were undercut by activities outside the
partnership and that there were no reasonable prospects of a return to
the corporation sufficient to offset the heavy transaction costs.
Judge Laro concluded as follows:
Each of the steps in the section 453 investment strategy was planned
and arrangements commenced considerably in advance of execution.
Before the negotiations to form ACM, Merrill had already begun
negotiations to purchase the Citicorp Notes. Before their purchase,
Merrill was negotiating for their disposition. By the time ACM ac-
quired the LIBOR Notes, Merrill was arranging with Sparekassen
the terms on which some of them would be sold. The contingent
payment sale was scheduled to take place before the end of ACM's
first taxable year in order to permit the partnership to spread its tax
basis in the Citicorp Notes over 6 years instead of 5. The distribution
and sale of the BFCE Notes was scheduled to occur before the end
of Colgate's 1989 taxable year in order to offset Southampton's share
of the contingent payment sale gain on Colgate's consolidated re-
turn. It was the understanding of the principals that Kannex would
retire from the partnership by the fall of 1991 so that the LIBOR
Notes could be sold in time for Colgate to carry back the taxable loss
to its 1988 taxable year. No supervening market forces or other non-
tax considerations disrupted the scheduled execution of these steps.
If we stood at the top of the world and looked down on this transac-
tion, we would see events unfolding during the year[s] * * * about as
they were contemplated ...
But for the $100 million of tax losses it generated for Colgate, the
section 453 investment strategy would not have been consistent with
rational economic behavior. The section 453 investment strategy
lacked economic substance. It served no useful nontax purpose. Ac-
cordingly, the pertinent adjustments made by respondent to ACM's
reported items of income and loss are sustained. [internal citations
omitted]33
ACM offers the following lessons for shelter promoters:
(1) It doesn't help to have a good "gimmick." The installment sale
basis argument in ACM was a very good gimmick, technically. It was
not challenged by the court, and the I.R.S. never argued clear reflec-
32. ACM Pship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2215 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 2228-29.
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tion of income as a basis for disallowance. Despite the apparent clar-
ity of the rule it relied upon, the investment banker and the
corporation were not willing to simply rely on its terms but con-
cocted a business purpose cover story.
(2) Cover stories, even complicated, well-crafted ones, will fail on
close examination. Promoters cannot assume a judge will be unable
or unwilling to perform the analysis required to undercut the cover
story. If the judge makes that effort, it may be assumed he will be
angry at the masquerade.
(3) Most shelter schemes require elaborate, pre-arranged scenarios.
These are easily unveiled in litigation, further prejudicing the
tribunal.
(4) The development and implementation of these schemes involves
considerable costs that are passed on to the shelter buyer. These
costs make it difficult to project positive pre-tax returns in invest-
ment in the shelter. But even if some pre-tax profit can be built in
(e.g., through investment of excess equity by the shelter purchaser)
there is no reasonable basis for concluding that the outcome would
change because a judge would almost certainly determine that the
essence of the transaction was the same-an orchestrated tax avoid-
ance scheme.
(5) To justify its development cost, the promoter will wish to use the
format on repeated occasions. Based on the discovery rulings in
ACM, which allowed the I.R.S. to obtain lists of shelter investors and
as further enhanced by recent tax shelter regulations, 34 the I.R.S.
may be expected to find out about, and disclose in court, parallel
transactions. This also undercuts the business purpose rationale and
prejudices the court against the promoter. Moreover, parallel trans-
actions improve the I.R.S. risk-reward ratio: in winning ACM the
I.R.S. in effect won the other ten cases involving parallel investors,
generating hundreds of millions in revenues for the government. Fi-
nally, numerous large transactions are difficult to conceal, and public
disclosure of these schemes is usually the kiss of death. Notably, the
ACM tax shelter blew up when it became the subject of widespread
professional and journalistic comment, culminating in a newspaper
article that disclosed the details of the transaction.35
VI. CONCLUSION
The government obviously feels great frustration in combating abusive
tax shelters. Shelters proliferate despite the government's recent sterling
litigation record. With audacious schemes like "Son of Boss" the govern-
ment is well justified in considering criminal sanctions. But cases like
ACM make it clear that the fault is not primarily in the substantive law.
34. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4T, 301.6111-2T; see also, 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301 (modify-
ing recent tax shelter regulations).
35. Randall Smith, Collection Drives: IRS Battles Colgate over an Arcane Deal That
Cuts Its Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1996, at Al; see also Janet Novack & Laura Saunders,
The Hustling of X Rated Shelters, FORBES, Dec. 14, 1999, at 198.
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TAX PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
Loss-generating shelters will almost always fail in litigation, for the rea-
sons described above in the analysis of ACM. They involve all the classic
abuse elements. First, there is the abuse of an uneconomic rule (the basis
allocation in ACM for example). Second, there is the involvement of a
passive tax-exempt party, functioning effectively as a lender (as the Tax
Court determined in ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r 36) to which un-
economic amounts of income were deflected. Third, there are the shifting
allocations bringing to the shelter-seeker the loss corresponding to the
income allocated to the exempt party. Fourth, there are the contrived
and pre-planned steps requisite to the strategy. Finally, there is the
rather preposterous business purpose cover story.
Whether other transactions deserve the peremptory treatment ac-
corded loss generators like ACM is largely a function of whether a court
will perceive them to be abusive. "Abusive" in this context means a gross
departure from sensible economic results and the fundamental tax princi-
ples underlying the Code. Step-down preferred is an interesting case.
Consider the simplified variation in which a domestic corporation and an
accommodation foreign or tax-exempt party each contribute $1000 to a
newly formed REIT, with the corporation taking back a common equity
interest and the tax-exempt taking back a preferred interest. The pre-
ferred interest pays a very high dividend for the first ten years (allowing
the tax-exempt to recover its capital and earn a return on its investment
during that period), after which the dividend rate drops to almost zero.
The REIT uses the $2000 to make a qualifying investment in mortgage-
backed securities issued by the domestic corporation, which generate just
enough income to cover the dividend payments on the preferred interest.
At the end of the ten year period, when the dividend rate is "stepped
down," the tax-exempt party's preferred interest is redeemed for its
(nominal) fair market value. In substance, the transaction resembles a
ten-year self-amortizing loan. But during those ten years, the domestic
corporation will have deducted all of the interest payments to the
REIT-and neither the corporation nor its subsidiary REIT, having dis-
tributed the interest payments to the tax-exempt, will have reported any
income associated with the transaction. Would a court regard this as a
tainted shelter? On the one hand, it bears resemblance to a true financ-
ing on the part of the domestic corporation. On the other hand, it gener-
ates benefits so grossly excessive that it probably would be closely
scrutinized. What happened in fact was probably just and fitting-the use
of I.R.S. regulatory power on a retroactive basis seems appropriate and
should not have surprised greedy participants. What a tax shelter regula-
tory scheme can add to the attack on such cases, as well as on other ag-
gressively structured financial products, is an early warning disclosure
system.
The key to deterrence for all classes of tax shelters is reporting and
penalties. To fight what amounts to audit lottery and to nip schemes in
36. 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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the bud, airtight, focused, prompt and efficient disclosure rules are re-
quired. These in turn need the support of qualified and organized audit
teams to review disclosure filings, as well as severe penalties (with no
relief based on legal opinions) for failure to disclose and for losing on the
merits. Given the track record in court, a tax director would need to have
his head examined if he allowed his corporation to participate in a shelter
that would have to be specifically disclosed and would bear heavy penal-
ties if not sustained, irrespective of supporting legal opinions.
As the New York State Bar and others have maintained, the definition
of tax shelters brought within the disclosure-penalty scheme should be
broad.37 An approach which targets the presence of one or more tax
shelter indicia (or "filters"), along the lines of § 1.6011-4T of the Regula-
tions, is probably better than one which focuses on a single factor such as
the absence of expected pre-tax returns. As significant as the tax shelter
definition is the disclosure mechanism. Of immense importance in this
regard is the "listed transactions" provision of § 1.6011-4T of the Regula-
tions, which requires tax shelter disclosure for transactions listed by the
I.R.S. whether or not they would have to be disclosed under the general
rules of that regulation and even if listing occurs after a return relating to
the transaction has been filed. (The I.R.S. posted an initial list in Notice
2000-15.) The elegance of a listing procedure is that it remains a Sword of
Damocles that may require disclosure of a type of transaction that comes
to the attention of the I.R.S., even after the taxpayer has entered into it.
Because of this factor, the basic tax shelter definition can be less sweep-
ing, minimizing the risk of over-disclosure of deals which are not really
shelters, protecting the I.R.S. and deterring shelters with the possibility of
subsequent listing.
Indeed, a streamlined disclosure approach could be built purely around
a listing procedure. Under this approach, the I.R.S. would have statutory
authority to publish tax shelter lists similar to those under § 1.6011-4T of
the Regulations. This authority would, necessarily, involve a tax shelter
definition but that definition would be less critical because it would relate
only to the authority to list, and would not be self-executing in terms of
disclosures or penalties. (In essence, the definition would be designed to
prevent the I.R.S. from overreaching by listing transactions which would
not properly be regarded as tax shelters.) A taxpayer involved in a tax
shelter which is listed would be required to make specific disclosure and
would face heavy, no-fault penalties (not avoided by legal opinions) if the
shelter were not sustained in litigation (heavier still if disclosure was not
made). Because of the penalty aspect, it might be desirable to limit the
retroactive nature of the penalty aspect of listing by having fully retroac-
tive disclosure rules for listed transactions but imposing penalties only
37. See New York State Bar Association (Tax Section), Report on Corporate Tax Shel-
ters of New York State Bar Association Tax Section, supra note 4; Lee A. Sheppard, News




where the transaction is listed before the return is filed for the year in
which shelter benefits are first claimed. Such a regime, coupled with the
well recognized attitude of the courts, should be effective and preemptive
in largely eliminating tax shelters. It is not intended by any means to deal
with aggressive tax planning in real world transactions, which would be
subject to attack under existing rules.
Much serious thinking has gone into defining tax shelters. However,
the uncertainties and vagaries inherent in a tax shelter definition are
much less troublesome where the issue is disclosure and penalties (espe-
cially where listing is a prerequisite to disclosure and penalties) rather
than the override of substantive rules. In transactions that are at the mar-
gin, aggressive financial instruments for example, requiring disclosure
does not seem burdensome to taxpayers and should be helpful to the gov-
ernment in providing early warning. By the same token, disclosure is less
of a deterrent to non-abusive financial innovation since, in any event,
these products tend to be widely discussed in public forums.
With the steps described above, given the judicial attitude, the tax shel-
ter problem should subside. At the very least, disclosure and penalties
should be given a chance to work before a substantive disallowance pro-
vision is adopted. The problems with such a provision are numerous. If
aimed at tax shelters narrowly defined in terms of a lack of a pre-tax
return, it will play into the hands of promoters who assert that the prob-
lem is only one of assuring a nominal cash return. Indeed, it could deter
courts from applying a holistic approach to shelter definition that has
proved devastatingly effective. The problem is not the lack of a minimum
return; the problem is contriving an artificial transaction to generate un-
reasonable, unintended benefits whether or not there is some cash return.
A broad definition of tax shelter in a statutory substantive disallowance
rule would only achieve what ACM and like cases already assure-
namely that an abusive transaction will fail in court. At the same time,
however, it is closely related to, and could morph into, a general anti-
avoidance rule of the type recently adopted in a number of foreign coun-
tries.38 Such a rule may make sense in countries that do not have a judi-
cially-created body of substance-over-form authority. It makes little
sense in the U.S. Substance versus form should remain a legal doctrine,
invoked by the I.R.S. and taxpayers but interpreted and applied by the
courts.
Who would favor a system in which the I.R.S. could unilaterally deter-
mine the substance of a transaction? Would it use that power to treat
stapled stock as one property or two, or would the characterization vary
with the consequences and change from time to time? Should the I.R.S.
be able to treat tracking stock as subsidiary stock by fiat and would the
38. Indeed, the Treasury Department White Paper, in dealing with "The Roads Not
Taken," refers to general anti-avoidance rules in other countries, which the Paper charac-
terizes as "general" anti-abuse rules as contrasted with the "specific" anti-abuse rules con-
tained in Treasury Department Proposals.
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characterization apply for all taxpayers and for all purposes? Should the
I.R.S. determine that a spin-off is really a sale? Could it make these
changes retroactively? The risks of such a change are too great, and the
need for such a change as a tax shelter deterrent is insufficiently estab-
lished, to justify such a step.
